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Abstract 
Why are many Westerners outraged by dog meat, but comfortable with pork? This is 
particularly puzzling given strong evidence that both species are highly intelligent. 
We suggest that although people consider intelligence a key factor in determining 
animals’ moral status, they disregard this information when it is self-relevant. In 
Study 1 we show that intelligence plays a major role in the moral concern afforded to 
animals in the abstract. In Study 2, we manipulated the intelligence of three animals – 
pigs, tapirs, and a fictional animal – and find that only for pigs does this information 
not influence moral standing. Finally, in Study 3 we show that people believe that 
learning about pig intelligence will lead to high levels of moral concern, yet when 
they themselves learn about pig intelligence, moral concern remains low. These 
findings demonstrate an important, predictable inconsistency in how people think 
about minds and moral concern.  
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“The only consistency in the way humans think about animals is inconsistency.” 
Andrew Rowan, Center for Animals and Public Policy, Tufts University 
 
Introduction 
The annual Yulin dog meat festival in China evoked widespread outrage in 
June 2015, particularly among Westerners, and China’s dog leather trade evokes 
further anger (PETA, 2014).  Yet many people who are offended by the killing of 
dogs for meat and leather goods are omnivores who eat beef, pork, and lamb, and buy 
leather products. Vegans are quick to point out the hypocrisy of this (Francione & 
Charlton, 2013; Joy, 2010), since pigs in particular equal and sometimes exceed dogs 
on cognitive ability. Still, even when acknowledging comparable levels of 
intelligence between dogs and pigs, many omnivores appear to respond to such 
criticisms by insisting on the unique moral status of dogs (Piazza, 2015). How can 
people dismiss the morally relevant qualities of animals that are killed and used as 
consumer products in their own culture, while freely endorsing these qualities in 
animals used for consumption in other cultures?  
We suggest that this is a case of motivated cognition. People disregard 
relevant information (e.g., intelligence) when it applies to an animal that they 
consume, and thus avoid a potential moral dilemma. This is different, we argue, from 
actively denying that a certain animal is intelligent. While some protesters might insist 
that dogs have greater claim to moral status than, say, pigs due to their superior 
intelligence, we argue that even if perceivers understand the intelligence of an animal, 
they still manage to disregard this information when forming a judgment of the 
animal’s moral standing, as if the information was irrelevant to the judgment.  
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In the present set of studies, we show that people utilize information about 
animal intelligence in a flexible, motivated manner. While everyone is influenced by 
intelligence information in the abstract—for example, when contemplating the moral 
standing of a novel animal (Study 1)—people tend to disregard such relevant 
information when consumption of the animal has implications for the individual, 
either because the animal is used as food in one’s culture (Study 2) or the person 
themselves consumes the animal (Study 3). We first situate our perspective within 
previous literature on animal minds and motivated cognition.   
 Attributing Mind to Animals and Judgments of Moral Standing  
Animals with “moral standing” are those animals perceived to deserve our 
moral concern and it would be wrong to harm (Singer, 1975/2009).  Past work by 
Piazza, Landy, and Goodwin (2014) has shown that when people judge animals’ 
moral standing they tend to utilize two basic dimensions: (1) how much “mind” an 
animal possesses, which involves two highly correlated aspects: experiential states 
(e.g., capacity to suffer and experience pleasure) and cognitive ability or intelligence 
(see also Bastian, Loughnan, Haslam, & Radke, 2012; cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 
2007; Sytsma & Machery, 2012), and, separately, (2) how harmful or dangerous the 
animal is. In the present studies, we focus on one aspect of mind perception, 
intelligence.  
Several studies have examined the flexible manner in which people attribute 
mind to animals (Bastian et al., 2012; Bilewicz, Inhoff, & Drogosz, 2011; Epley, 
Waytz, Akalis, & Cacioppo, 2008; Loughnan, Bastian, & Haslam, 2010; Rothgerber, 
2014). This past work has shown that people alter their judgments of animal 
intelligence to be in line with their actions, for example, when they are made aware 
that eating animals is inconsistent with the animal’s moral standing (Bastian et al., 
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2012; Loughnan et al., 2010). Thus, research has firmly established that when people 
are concerned about how their behavior toward an animal might be inconsistent with 
the endorsement of its standing, they adjust their mind attribution accordingly 
(Loughnan, Bastian, & Haslam, 2014). This leads to an interesting prospect: 
providing strong or incontrovertible evidence for the minds of animals may reduce 
people’s willingness to harm or eat them. Yet we are skeptical about the efficacy of 
such a strategy. We suspect, rather, that “animal-mind” interventions are often likely 
to fail due to the motivated way in which people (dis)regard intelligence information 
even when it is readily available.  
Motivated Cognition  
We anticipate that people will actively disregard intelligence information 
when considering the moral standing of certain animals that pose a moral challenge to 
the consumer. That is, while evidence for an animal’s mind is generally persuasive, it 
is not compelling when a person is motivated to defend their use of the animal as food.  
Our skepticism derives from the wealth of past research in social psychology, which 
reveals the flexible ways people use information to maintain a positive view of the 
self (Dunning, 1999; Kunda, 1990). For instance, this work has shown that: people 
tend to affirm the utility of traits that they think they possess, and underrate the utility 
of traits they think they lack (Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991); people criticize the 
moral actions of others if they reflect poorly on themselves (Monin, Sawyer, & 
Marquez, 2008); people modify their attributions of others to support their desired 
beliefs about them (Klein & Kunda, 1992; Murray, 1999); people willfully avoid 
information about their consumer decisions that could potentially influence their 
purchasing behavior (Ehrich & Irwin, 2005); and people endorse beliefs about meat 
that fit with their dietary practices (Piazza, Ruby, Loughnan, et al., 2015). Together, 
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studies like these show that people utilize information in a flexible way in order to 
reach the conclusion they would like, particularly when the judgment has implications 
for how they view themselves, especially how they view themselves morally. 
In the present set of studies we apply a motivated social cognition perspective 
to better understand why people are inconsistent in the way they use information that, 
in the abstract, people believe to be relevant to the moral consideration of animals. 
We hypothesize that people are motivated to use (or ignore) intelligence information 
strategically to avoid the moral implications of how certain animals are treated, in 
particular, when they are used as food.  
Overview of Studies 
In Study 1, we first sought to establish that most people, independent of diet, 
utilize intelligence information in their moral standing judgments when the animal 
creates no moral dilemma for the perceiver. We accomplished this by presenting 
participants with a novel, fictional (alien) species, which they had no prior 
relationship with, while manipulating the species’ level of intelligence. In Study 2 we 
varied the moral relevance of the animal for the individual, by manipulating whether 
the target was an animal used as food in the participants’ society, while independently 
manipulating the intelligence of the animal target. Finally, in Study 3, we manipulated 
the intelligence of the animal, while, independently, manipulating whether meat 
consumers considered the moral standing of the animal from their own perspective or 
someone else’s.  
Study 1 – Alien Animals  
Method1 
                                                
1 All materials for all studies are available from the Open Science Framework 
(osf.io/e3fx2/?view_only=abb6734bf74a464ba73c2d2cfa7ef54a). For all studies we 
report all conditions and dependent measures for which data was collected.  
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Participants and design. We recruited 59 participants (38 male, 21 female) 
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com; see Paolacci & Chandler, 2014).  
Recruitment was limited to workers located in the U.S., who were paid $0.50. Our 
aim in each study was to recruit n=30 per cell with power=.80 to detect an estimated 
medium-to-large effect (d=0.65; two-tailed). One participant failed to complete the 
study in the allotted timeframe; inclusion of this person does not change the results. 
We used a single variable, between-subjects design and randomly assigned people to 
the High intelligence (n=31) or Low intelligence (n=28) condition. 
Materials and procedures. We used a novel animal paradigm, similar to 
Piazza et al. (2014, Study 2). Participants were asked to imagine that in the distant 
future scientists went on an expedition to another planet and discovered a new species 
called the “trablans.” The scientists spent several months studying the behavior of the 
trablans and found that they had certain characteristics. All participants read that the 
trablans possessed some “filler” characteristics (i.e., group living, herbivores). Next, 
they read that the trablans possessed additional traits, which constituted our between-
subjects manipulation of intelligence: 
 
High intelligence: The trablans are intelligent and inquisitive. They display 
sophisticated problem solving abilities, including tool use. Trablans can learn 
simple rules and memorize pattern sequences to get food. 
 
Low intelligence: The trablans are neither intelligent nor inquisitive. They do 
not display even basic problem-solving abilities, like the use of basic tools. 
Trablans often fail to learn even simple rules and cannot memorize pattern 
sequences to get food. 
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 We assessed participants’ comprehension of the materials: “To what extent do 
the trablans seem intelligent?” assessed on a 1 (Not at all intelligent) to 7 (Very 
intelligent) scale. Participants then read that after several months of studying the 
trablans, one of the scientists suggests that they consider hunting, cooking, and eating 
the trablans. The scientists have enough food, but this individual points out that their 
supplies can last even longer if they supplement them by eating the trablans. The 
trablans were additionally described as edible (made of protein and fat, non-
poisonous).  
Participants then responded to five moral standing questions (α=.95), rated on 
a scale 1=Not at all, 7=Very much so: “Is it OK to start eating the trablans?”; “Is it 
morally questionable to start eating the trablans?”; “Is it morally wrong to start eating 
the trablans?”; “Would you eat the trablans if you were in the same situation?”; 
“Would you protect the trablans by not eating them if you were in the same situation?” 
Items were scored so that higher scores represented greater attributions of moral 
standing. Separately, participants were also asked to imagine that they were one of the 
scientists and voted on whether the outpost should start hunting trablans: “Yes – hunt 
them” or “No – leave them be.” 
At the end of the study participants’ dietary practices were assessed on the 
following scale: 1=“Meat-lover: I prefer to eat meat”; 2=“Omnivore: I eat meat and 
vegetables”; 3=“Restricted omnivore: I eat meat, but not very much”; 4=“Fish only 
omnivore: I eat fish, but no other meat”; 5=“Vegetarian: I do not eat any meat”; 
6=“Vegan: I do not eat any meat or animal products.”  
Results 
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 The manipulation of intelligence was successful. Participants in the High 
Intelligence condition rated the trablans as more intelligent (M=5.71, SD=0.82) than 
those in the Low Intelligence condition (M=2.11, SD=1.50), t(57)=11.58, p<.001, η
2
p=.702. 
 We first examined the dichotomous measure of moral standing using a Chi-
square test. There was a significant effect of Intelligence on the frequency of “Don’t 
hunt” responses, χ2(1)=9.23, p=.002, φ=.396. In the High intelligence condition, 
93.5% of participants voted against hunting the trablans. In the Low intelligence 
condition, 60.7% voted against hunting the trablans.  
Next, we ran a one-way ANOVA on Intelligence with our continuous measure 
of moral standing. When trablans were described as having high intelligence they 
were afforded more moral standing (M=5.17, SD=1.54) than when they were 
described as having low intelligence (M=3.73, SD=1.89), F(1,57)=9.68, p=.003, 
d=.84, 95% confidence interval (CI)=[2.98, 4.23]. Diet did not play a large part in 
participants’ moral standing judgments: diet (measured continuously from meat-
lovers to vegans) was weakly and non-significantly related to moral standing 
judgments, r(58)=.16, p=.21.   
Discussion 
 As predicted, when there is no prior relationship with the animal, participants, 
largely independent of diet, tended to utilize intelligence information in their 
judgments of an animal’s moral standing. Furthermore, in a follow-up study where we 
manipulated the perceived need2 for using trablans as a source of food, we replicated 
the findings regarding the use of intelligence, independent of perceived need, 
                                                
2 The scientists were described as running out of supplies at different levels of 
urgency, ranging from having rations to spare (very little need) to running very low 
on rations (extreme need).  
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F(1,84)=26.50, p<.001, η2p=.240. Thus, the findings are not limited to situations in 
which people think it is unnecessary to use the animal because alternative food 
sources are available.  
Study 2 – Who’s eating the Animal? Us vs. Them 
In Study 2, we sought to test the hypothesis that intelligence information 
matters differently for animals eaten in one’s own culture versus animals in another 
culture. We sought to show this using two different contrasts: comparing a real animal 
used for food in one’s own culture (pigs) with a real animal not used for food in one’s 
own culture but eaten in another culture (tapir), and comparing pigs with a fictitious 
animal hypothetically used for food in another culture (trablans). Across the three 
targets, we experimentally manipulated the animal’s intelligence (high vs. low) in an 
identical manner. We also controlled for whether the animal was described as being 
used as food. We did this to rule out the possibility that any differences may be 
explained by the participants’ categorization of pigs as “food” and the other targets as 
“not food,” since past research has found reductions in moral standing when people 
thought of animals as a food source (Bratanova, Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011). Here 
we wished to examine whether it is the self-relevance of using the animal for food, 
rather than the conceptualization of animals as food, which leads to reductions in 
moral status.  
In a preliminary study we found that participants rated pigs as having 
significantly lower moral standing than both tapirs and trablans when equating for the 
animal’s intelligence.3 In the main study, we manipulated intelligence and predicted 
                                                
3 Participants (N=89 MTurkers) in this study were presented only the High 
intelligence information of Study 2. Despite equating intelligence across the three 
targets, participants judged the moral standing of pigs (M=48.81, SD=31.17) to be less 
than tapirs (M=77.80, SD=19.09), p<.001, d=1.12, 95% CI=[-45.31, -12.68], and less 
than trablans (M=73.64, SD=29.27), p=.002, d=.82, 95% CI=[-41.74, -7.93]. The 
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that intelligence would affect the moral standing of other-relevant animals (tapirs and 
trablans), but not self-relevant ones (pigs).  
Method 
 Participants and design. We recruited 178 participants located in the UK via 
Prolific Academic. Participants were paid £1.00 and randomly assigned to condition. 
Sixteen participants reported not eating pork, ham or bacon, and thus were removed 
from the analysis. An additional nine participants failed to complete either the 
manipulation check (n=1) or at least 3 of the 5 moral standing questions (n=8), and 
thus were removed from the analysis.4 The final sample was comprised of 70 males, 
73 females (Mage=34.25 years, SD=11.56). We used a 2 (High vs. Low intelligence) x 
3 (Pigs, Tapirs, Trablans) between-subjects design.  
Materials and procedures. Participants were presented with high or low 
intelligence information about the animal target they were assigned to (materials can 
be found here: osf.io/e3fx2/?view_only=abb6734bf74a464ba73c2d2cfa7ef54a). 
Within each intelligence condition, the only piece of information that varied between 
targets was the animal label. In the High intelligence condition the target animal was 
described as being quite smart in comparison to dogs. In the Low intelligence 
condition the target animal was described as being intellectual inferior to dogs. The 
information, originally written about pigs, was taken from the Humane Society’s 
website 
[www.humanesociety.org/animals/pigs/pigs_more.html?credit=web_id86167507]. 
Although this might be considered a weakness of the design – the information may 
better suit pigs – we note that this works against our hypothesis. After reading the 
                                                                                                                                      
moral standing of tapirs and trablans was rated equally high, p=.83, d=.17, 95% CI=[-
21.06, 12.74].  
4 The results were not at all affected by leaving these nine participants in the sample 
(see also Footnote 5). 
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information, participants wrote a few sentences about what they had read and rated 
the intelligence of the target animal on a 1 (Not at all intelligent) to 7 (Extremely 
intelligent) scale.  
On a new page, participants responded to five moral standing questions rated 
on 0-100 scales. First, they were presented a short paragraph describing that people 
eat pigs in the West, that people eat tapirs in Asia and South America, and that settlers 
on the distant planet eat trablans. All participants learned that the animal was 
originally hunted in the wild, but is increasingly farmed for human consumption. 
After reading this they rated how bad and, separately, how guilty they would feel 
about eating the animal (0=Not at all bad [guilty]; 100=Extremely bad [guilty]). Next, 
they learned about the abusive treatment of the animal in their society (pigs), in 
Asia/South America, or the distant planet (e.g., “tapirs slaughtered for their meat are 
kept in solitary confinement their whole lives with hardly enough space to turn around, 
and often times are abused by industrial farmers—for example, they are kicked, 
beaten, castrated, and have their tails cut off”). This information was the same for all 
conditions. After reading this participants rated how bad and, separately, how guilty 
they feel about how the animal is treated. Lastly, they reported how wrong it is to eat 
the animal (0=Completely OK to eat; 100=Extremely wrong to eat). The five items 
had high internal reliability (α=.88) and thus were averaged into a single moral-
standing index. At the end participants provided demographic and dietary information.  
Results 
 Looking first at intelligence ratings, the manipulation was effective for all 
three targets: pigs, η2p=.590, tapirs, η2p=.779, and trablans, η2p=.733. In the High 
intelligence condition, there was no difference in the perceived intelligence of the 
animal target, F(2,65)=.23, p=.794, η2p=.007 (Mpigs=5.55, SD=1.01; Mtapirs=5.62, 
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SD= 0.86; Mtrablans=5.44, SD=0.82). In the Low intelligence condition, there was a 
significant effect of animal target, F(2,72)=3.61, p=.032, η2p=.091, with pigs rated 
more intelligent (M=2.83, SD=1.27) than trablans (M=1.96, SD=1.26), p=.028, but 
pigs and tapirs (M=2.21, SD=0.98), p=.166, and tapirs and trablans, p=.740, rated 
equally intelligent. 
We conducted a 2x3 ANOVA on the moral standing index with intelligence 
and animal target as the independent variables. Both main effects were significant: 
intelligence, F(1,137)=17.89, p<.001, η2p=.116; animal, F(1,137)=12.31, p<.001, η
2
p=.152. The interaction was not significant, F(1,137)=1.15, p=.319, η2p=.017. To 
test our prediction, we conducted follow-up contrasts (Tukey’s HSD). At both levels 
of intelligence pigs were afforded the lowest levels of moral standing (see Figure 1). 
Consistent with our preliminary study, when the targets were presented as highly 
intelligent, participants judged the moral standing of pigs to be less than tapirs, 
p=.001, d=1.08, 95% CI=[-42.14, -9.10], and less than trablans, p=.001, d=1.01, 95% 
CI=[-40.32, -8.65]. The moral standing of intelligent tapirs and trablans was rated 
equally high, p=.984, d=.06, 95% CI=[-17.16, 14.89]. When the targets were 
presented as having low intelligence, pigs were afforded less standing than tapirs, 
p=.016, d=.83, 95% CI=[-33.99, -2.94], though not significantly less than trablans, 
p=.217, d=.52, 95% CI=[-25.72, 4.45], and tapirs and trablans did not differ, p=.433, 
d=.32, 95% CI=[-7.25, 22.92]. Most importantly, confirming our prediction, 
intelligence had no impact on moral-standing judgments for pigs, p=.196, d =.38, 
95% CI=[-22.77, 4.79], but it did have an impact on the moral standing of tapirs, 
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p=.023, d =.71, 95% CI=[-29.95, -2.33], and trablans, p<.001, d =1.06, 95% CI=[-
34.87, -10.80], in the predicted direction (Figure 1).5 
 
Figure 1 
Moral standing means and standard errors (± 1 S.E.) from Study 2 by intelligence 
and animal condition.  
 
   
Consistent with our predictions, enhancing the intelligence of pigs (an animal 
used as food in the participants’ culture) had little effect on its moral standing. By 
contrast, enhancing the intelligence of other-relevant animals (tapirs, trablans) led to 
marked increases in their moral standing.  
Study 3 – Who’s eating the Animal? Self vs. Other  
 In Study 3, we sought to obtain convergent evidence for our motivational 
hypothesis by showing that intelligence information is utilized differently for the 
same animal target (pigs) when a person takes the perspective of another person 
                                                
5 When these within-target contrasts were conducted including the nine exclusions, 
the effect sizes (η2p) were .01, .12, .23, respectively.   
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versus themselves. We expected intelligence information to influence moral standing 
judgments when a person adopts another person’s perspective (how others will think 
and feel), but such information should have little effect on judgments when a person 
uses their own perspective (how do I think and feel).   
Method 
 Participants. We recruited a new sample of 127 participants located in the 
U.K. via Prolific Academic for £0.50 payment. We were only interested in the 
responses of participants who personally eat pig meat (“pork, ham, or bacon”) or who 
correctly reported that John eats pig meat. Ten participants reported they or John did 
not eat pig meat, and were omitted from analysis (they were still paid), leaving a total 
of 117 participants (50 male, 67 female; Mage=31.50 years, SD=10.54).  
Design. We used a 2 (perspective: self vs. other) x 2 (intelligence: high vs. 
low) fully between-subjects design with random assignment. 
 Materials. All participants were given information about the mental capacities 
of pigs. However, in the other perspective condition, participants were asked to 
imagine that another person, ‘John’, was working on a project when he discovered 
information about pigs’ intelligence. Participants in this condition also learned that 
John owns a pet dog and eats pigs “with bacon being his favorite food.” We included 
an attention check, “Does John eat pigs (pork, ham, or bacon)?”, which all 
participants passed. In the self perspective condition, participants simply answered 
from their own perspective. 
In the high intelligence condition, participants read information about the 
superior cognitive abilities of pigs, relative to dogs. The information was fairly 
similar to that used in Study 2. In the low intelligence condition, participants read the 
same information only the labels “pigs” and “dogs” were switched, thus, 
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communicating that dogs possess superior cognitive abilities relative to pigs. The 
information was originally written about pigs, not dogs. This deception was revealed 
to all participants at the end of the study. Again, any effect of information fit would 
work against our hypothesis.  
After reading the intelligence information, participants wrote briefly about 
what they read and rated the intelligence of pigs on a scale 1 (Not at all intelligent) to 
7 (Very intelligent), responded to the pig-eating probe, and then responded to five 
moral-standing items, on 0-100 scales, similar to Study 2. First, two items assessed 
how guilty/bad they or John felt about eating pigs. Next participants read a brief 
passage about how pigs are treated in American society similar to the passage used in 
Study 2, followed by two questions gauging how guilty/bad they feel or John would 
feel about how society treats pigs, and one question assessing how wrong they think 
or John thinks it is to eat pigs. The five moral-standing items were internally reliable 
(α=.93) and were averaged together. Lastly, participants completed demographics as 
in Study 2.  
Results and Discussion 
 The intelligence manipulation was highly effective (Mhigh=5.75, SD=1.02; 
Mlow=3.14, SD=1.45), t(115)=11.27, p<.001, d=2.08. As predicted, there was a 
significant interaction between intelligence and perspective on moral standing, 
F(1,113)=5.73, p=.018, η2p=.048 (Figure 2). There was also a main effect of 
intelligence, F(1,113)=20.90, p<.001, η2p=.156, but no main effect of perspective, 
F(1,113)=2.06, p=.15, η2p=.018.6 Simple-effects tests were conducted to decompose 
                                                
6 We replicated the results of Study 3 in another study that combined datasets from 
two earlier MTurk studies, one using the ‘self’ condition and another using the ‘John’ 
condition to recreate the 2x2 design (N=168); intelligence x perspective, 
F(1,164)=9.76, p=.002, η2p=.056, intelligence, F(1,164)=17.56, p<.001, η2p=.097, 
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the interaction. When high intelligence information was presented, this information 
influenced moral standing judgments more when participants adopted John’s 
perspective than when adopting their own perspective, t(58)=2.80, p=.007, d=.72, 
95% CI=[-28.58, -4.77]. When low intelligence information was presented, this 
information did not influence judgments irrespective of perspective, t(55)=.65, p=.52, 
d=.17, 95% CI=[-8.60, 16.93]. Critically, when participants adopted John’s 
perspective, the intelligence information influenced moral standing judgments in the 
predicted direction, t(60)=5.08, p<.001, d=1.29, 95% CI=[-42.26, -18.38] (Figure 2). 
But when participants adopted their own perspective, intelligence information did not 




Moral standing of pigs, means and standard errors (± 1 S.E.) from Study 3 as a 
function of intelligence and perspective.  
 
                                                                                                                                      
perspective, F(1,164)=0.43, p=.51, η2p=.003. The simple effects were very similar to 
those in Study 3. 
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Thus, as predicted, participants expected John to feel bad and change his 
judgment when reading about how intelligent pigs were, but when presented with the 
same information, the effect on their feelings and judgment was muted. 
Looking across the three studies, we can see a striking pattern of results (see 
Table 1). When the treatment of an animal has no relevance for the self (or one’s 
group), or the animal is not being used for its meat, intelligence is consequential for 
the moral standing of the animal. In a lone deviant cell (shaded grey), when meat gets 
personal, then intelligence loses relevance.   
 
Table 1  
When intelligence matters: Summary of effects across all three studies.  





















 Across three studies, we found that people use intelligence information 
strategically when judging the moral standing of animals. Virtually everyone is 
affected by intelligence information when reasoning about an animal for which they 
have no prior knowledge (Study 1). However, our omnivore participants seemed 
relatively impervious to information about the intelligence of animals currently being 
used as food within their own culture (Study 2) and failed to use intelligence 
information when considering from their own perspective the moral standing of an 
MOTIVATED USE OF INTELLIGENCE  18 
animal they consume (Study 3). Together these studies highlight the flexible way 
people utilize the characteristics relevant to the moral status of animals.  
The present studies may be understood through the lens of motivated 
cognition (Dunning, 1999; Kunda, 1990), and extends past research into the 
psychological processes underlying judgments of animals. Past findings have shown 
that omnivores will at times reduce their attribution of mind to animals to 
accommodate their behavior (e.g., eating meat), perhaps to reduce cognitive 
dissonance (Bastian et al., 2012; Loughnan et al., 2010). Here we have shown that 
people also disregard intelligence information that is available to them when forming 
moral standing judgments of animals that have high self-relevance. Additionally, past 
research has shown that categorizing animals as food, as opposed to living beings, 
reduces perceptions of the animal’s moral standing (Bratanova et al., 2011). Here we 
have shown that categorizing an animal as food leads to declinations in an animal’s 
moral status particularly when the animal has relevance for the self. 
Limitations, Future Directions, and Implications  
 While we see our motivational perspective applying beyond the treatment of 
food animals, for example, to animals used in medical research, product testing, or 
subject to culling programs, we cannot at this time draw firm conclusions. However, 
our perspective offers clear, testable predictions about the contexts in which we 
should expect reasoning to be motivationally biased—namely, when the questionable 
treatment of the animal implicates the perceiver (Table 1).  
The present perspective offers a number of directions for future research. 
Research should examine whether people actively avoid intelligence information 
about animals that are potentially morally problematic. In one unpublished study 
(n=120) we found a negative correlation of r=-.28 between a person’s commitment to 
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eating meat and their interest in reading scientific articles about the cognitive abilities 
of pigs, but nearly no correlation (-.01) between meat commitment and interest in 
reading scientific articles about dog intelligence (an animal not eaten in the 
participants’ culture). This preliminary study suggests that people may not simply 
disregard problematic information; they may at times actively avoid it as well.  Such a 
process, if it exists, would be consistent with the notion of “willful ignorance,” which 
has been documented with regards to other consumer choices where information 
about a product (e.g., its ethical attributes), if requested or made known, might 
conflict with the motivation to use it (Ehrich & Irwin, 2005). Furthermore, 
investigations should widen the scope of morally relevant information employed, and 
the choice of animal targets. Finally, our findings cannot rule between whether 
omnivores were motivated by a desire to preserve the cultural tradition of eating pork 
or to avoid feeling guilty about eating pork themselves. Indeed, feeling guilty about 
how one’s society treats pigs correlated strongly with feeling guilty about eating them. 
Nonetheless, future studies should attempt to tease apart these motivations.    
Our findings have implications for animal-welfare campaigns, such as those 
run by PETA and Humane Society, which showcase animal intelligence as a means of 
persuading consumers to refrain from buying and consuming animal products. Our 
findings suggest that such campaigns face a difficult obstacle in the form of motivated 
disregard of relevant information that has implications for the consumer. Informing 
people about the cognitive abilities of animals may not be an effective strategy to 
change moral attitudes, at least not on its own, as it fails to address the underlying 
motivational forces operating (of course, many campaigns use a variety of strategies). 
Nonetheless, in cases where the mistreatment of an animal does not implicate the 
consumer, for example, because the person does not wittingly consume products from 
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the animal or the animal is valued and protected in one’s culture, such mind-
enhancing campaigns may prove more effective (e.g., Western campaigns petitioning 
China’s dog leather trade or Japan’s whaling fleets).    
Conclusion 
 A number of theorists have noted how notoriously inconsistent people are in 
their thinking about animals. Here we have pointed to one such inconsistency; people 
appear to use intelligence information in a motivated fashion. In the abstract, when 
presented with foreign or fictitious animals eaten by distant or non-existent people, 
we see intelligent animals as worthy of our moral concern. When those animals are 
closer to home and we are the eaters, intelligence becomes conveniently irrelevant. 
Smart animals deserve our moral concern, unless, of course, we want to eat them.    
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